Abstract-To push up the error tolerance rate of quantum key distribution, I propose a prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution scheme using N -dimensional quantum particles as information carriers where N is a prime power. Remarkably, this prepare-and-measure scheme can distribute a provably secure key against all attacks allowed by the laws of quantum physics for at least one-third bit error rate whenever N is even and N ≥ 16. Since one-third bit error rate is the maximum limit for any qubit-based key distribution scheme to handle securely, the scheme reported here demonstrates the advantage of using high dimensional quantum particles as information carriers at high eavesdropping rate.
I. INTRODUCTION

K
EY distribution is the art of sharing a secret key between two cooperative players Alice and Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. If Alice and Bob distribute their key by exchanging classical messages only, Eve may at least in principle wiretap their conservations without being caught. So given unlimited computational resources, Eve can crack the secret key. In contrast, the no-cloning theorem assures that an unknown quantum state cannot be perfectly copied [1] , [2] . Therefore, if Alice and Bob distribute their secret key by sending quantum signals, then any eavesdropping attempt will almost surely affect their signal fidelity. Consequently, a carefully designed quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme allows Alice and Bob to accurately determine the quantum channel error rate, which in turn reflects the eavesdropping rate. If the estimated quantum channel error rate is too high, Alice and Bob abort the scheme and start all over again. Otherwise, they perform certain privacy amplification procedure to distill out an almost perfectly secure key [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . Therefore, it is conceivable that a provably secure QKD scheme exists even when Eve has unlimited computational power.
With this belief in mind, researchers proposed many QKD schemes [7] . These schemes differ in many ways such as the Hilbert space dimension of the quantum particle used, as well as the states and bases Alice and Bob prepared and measured. The first QKD scheme, commonly known as BB84, was invented by Bennett and Brassard [8] . In BB84, Alice randomly and independently prepares each qubit in one of the following four states: |0 , |1 and (|0 ± |1 )/ √ 2, and sends them to Bob. Upon reception, Bob randomly and independently measures each qubit in either the {|0 , |1 } or H. F. Chau is with the Department of Physics, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong. (E-mail: hfchau@hkusua.hku.hk) {(|0 ±|1 )/ √ 2} bases [8] . In short, BB84 is an experimentally feasible prepare-and-measure scheme involving the transfer of qubits [7] . Later, Bruß introduced another experimentally feasible prepare-and-measure scheme known as the six-state scheme [9] . In her scheme, Alice randomly and independently prepares each qubit in one of the following six states: |0 , |1 , (|0 ± |1 )/ √ 2 and (|0 ± i|1 ) √ 2; and Bob measures each of them randomly and independently in the following three bases: {|0 , |1 }, {|0 ± |1 } and {|0 ± i|1 }. Although the six-state scheme is more complex and generates a key less efficiently, Bruß found that it tolerates higher noise level than BB84 if Eve attacks each qubit individually [9] . In addition to qubit-based schemes such as BB84 and the six-state scheme, a number of QKD schemes involving higher dimensional as well as continuous systems have been proposed [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] . Most importantly, studies showed that many schemes involving higher dimensional systems tolerate higher error rates under individual particle attack [12] , [14] , [16] , [17] , [18] .
Are these QKD schemes really secure? Is it really true that the six-state scheme tolerates higher error level than BB84? The answers to these questions turn out to be highly non-trivial. Recall that the all powerful Eve may choose to attack the transmitted qubits collectively by applying a unitary operator to entangle these qubits with her quantum particles. In this situation, most of our familiar tools such as law of large numbers and classical probability theory do not apply to the resultant highly entangled non-classical state. These make vigorous cryptanalyses of BB84 and the six-state schemes extremely difficult.
In spite of these difficulties, a few air-tight security proofs against all possible eavesdropping attacks for BB84 and the six-state scheme have been discovered. Vigorous proofs for QKD schemes with rising error tolerance level are also found. After a few years of work, Mayers [5] and Biham et al. [19] eventually proved the security of BB84 against all kinds of attack allowed by the known laws of quantum physics. In particular, Mayers showed that in BB84 a provably secure key can be generated whenever the channel error rate is less than about 7% [5] . Along a different line, Lo and Chau [4] proved the security of an entanglement-based QKD scheme by means of a random hashing technique based on entanglement purification [20] . Their security proof is conceptually simple and appealing. Nevertheless, their scheme requires quantum computers and hence is not practical at this moment. By ingeniously combining the essence of Mayers and Lo-Chau proofs, Shor and Preskill gave a security proof of BB84 that applies up to 11.0% error rate [21] . This is a marked improvement over the 7% error tolerance rate in Mayers' proof.
Since then, the Shor-Preskill proof became a blueprint for the cryptanalysis of many QKD schemes. For instance, Lo [22] as well as Gottesman and Lo [23] extended it to cover the sixstate QKD scheme. At the same time, the work of Gottesman and Lo also demonstrates that using local quantum operation plus two way classical communication (LOCC2) help to raise the error tolerance rate of QKD [23] . Furthermore, they found that the six-state scheme tolerates a higher error rate than BB84 because the six-state scheme gives better estimates for the three Pauli error rates [23] . In search of a qubit-based QKD scheme that tolerates higher error rate, Chau recently discovered an adaptive entanglement purification procedure inspired by the technique used by Gottesman and Lo in Ref. [23] . He further gave a Shor-Preskill-based proof showing that this adaptive entanglement purification procedure allows the six-state scheme to generate a provably secure key up to a bit error rate of 0.5−0.1 √ 5 ≈ 27.6% [24] , making it the most error-tolerant prepare-and-measure scheme involving qubits to date.
Unlike various qubit-based QKD schemes, a vigorous security proof against the most general type of eavesdropping attack on a QKD scheme involving higher dimensional quantum systems is lacking. Besides, the error tolerance capability for this kind of QKD schemes against the most general eavesdropping attack is virtually unexplored. In fact, almost all relevant cryptanalyses focus on individual particle attack; and they suggest that QKD schemes involving higher dimensional systems may be more error-tolerant [12] , [14] , [16] , [18] . It is, therefore, instructive to give air-tight security proofs and to analyze the error tolerance rates for this type of schemes.
There is a further reason to study QKD schemes involving high dimensional quantum particles. By the so-called intercept-and-resend strategy that measures every transmitted qubit randomly and independently in {|0 , |1 }, {|0 ± |1 } or {|0 ± i|1 } bases, no qubit-based QKD scheme can generate a secure key if the bit error rate of the channel is at least one-third. (See Theorem 5 in Section IV for proof.) Hence, the only way to break the one-third bit error rate barrier in QKD schemes is to go for higher dimensional quantum particle transmission.
In this paper, I analyze the security and error tolerance capability of a prepare-and-measure QKD scheme involving the transmission of higher dimensional quantum systems. I begin by briefly reviewing the general assumptions on the capabilities of Alice, Bob and Eve together with a precisely stated security requirement for a general QKD scheme in Section II. Then, I introduce an entanglement-based QKD scheme involving the transmission of N -dimensional quantum systems where N is a prime power in Section III and prove its security against the most general eavesdropping attack in Section IV. Finally, I arrive at the provably secure prepareand-measure scheme by standard Shor and Preskill reduction argument in Section V. The proof shows that using higher dimensional system indeed improves error tolerance capability. In particular, Alice and Bob can establish a provably secure key even at one-third bit error rate whenever N ≥ 16 is a power of 2. Lastly, I give a brief summary in Section VI.
II. GENERAL FEATURES AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
Let me briefly review the assumptions, general features and security requirements for a QKD scheme in this section.
In QKD, we assume that Alice and Bob have access to two communication channels. The first one is an insecure noisy quantum channel. The other one is an unjammable noiseless authenticated classical channel where everyone, including Eve, can listen to but cannot alter the content passing through it. We also take the liberty that Alice and Bob have complete control over the apparatus in their own laboratories; and everything outside their laboratories except the unjammable classical channel may be manipulated by the all powerful Eve. We further make the most pessimistic assumption that Eve is capable of performing any operation in her controlled territory that is allowed by the known laws of quantum physics [6] , [7] .
Given an unjammable classical and an insecure quantum channels, a QKD scheme consists of three stages [3] . The first is signal preparation and transmission stage where quantum signals are prepared and exchanged between Alice and Bob. The second is signal quality test stage where a subset of the exchanged quantum signals is measured in order to estimate the eavesdropping rate in the quantum channel. The final phase is the signal privacy amplification stage where a carefully designed privacy amplification procedure is performed to distill out an almost perfectly secure key.
No matter how good the design is, no QKD scheme can be 100% secure as Eve may be lucky enough to guess the preparation or measurement bases for each quantum state correctly. Hence, it is more reasonable to demand the mutual information between Eve and the final secret key to be exponentially small. Hence I adopt the following definition of security. [4] ): With the above assumptions on the unlimited computational power of Eve, a QKD scheme is said to be unconditionally secure with security parameters (ǫ p , ǫ I ) provided that whenever Eve has a cheating strategy that passes the signal quality control test with probability greater than ǫ p , the mutual information between Eve and the final secret key is less than ǫ I .
Definition 1 (Based on Lo and Chau
III. AN ENTANGLEMENT-BASED QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
In what follows, I first introduce a unitary operator T which plays a pivotal role in the design of the QKD scheme in Subsection III-A. Then, I make use of the operator T to construct the entanglement-based QKD scheme in Subsection III-B.
A. The Unitary Operator T
In the analysis of certain quantum error correcting codes, Gottesman introduced a unitary operator that permutes the σ x , σ y and σ z errors [25] . Later on, Lo observed that the same operator permutes the three bases used by the six-state scheme, namely, {|0 , |1 }, {|0 ±|1 } and {|0 ±i|1 }. He further used the permuting property of this unitary operator to argue that the σ x , σ y and σ z error rates of the transmitted quantum signals in the six-state scheme are equal [22] . This is an important step in the analysis of the error tolerance rate of the six-state scheme as it greatly restricts the possible form of error in the transmitted quantum signals.
To devise a highly error-tolerant higher dimensional QKD scheme, one naturally asks if it is possible to find a unitary operator T that permutes as many types of single quantum register errors as possible. In this subsection, I am going to show that such an operator T indeed exists. But before doing so, I need to introduce a few notations.
Definition 2 (Knill [26] ): Suppose a ∈ GF (N ) where N = p n with p being a prime. We define the unitary operators X a and Z a action on an N -dimensional Hilbert space by
and
where χ a is an additive character of the finite field GF (N ), ω p is a primitive pth root of unity and Tr(a) = a + a p + a
is the absolute trace of a ∈ GF (N ). Note that, the arithmetic inside the state ket and in the exponent of ω p is performed in the finite field GF (N ).
It is easy to see from Definition 2 that {X a Z b : a, b ∈ GF (N )} spans the set of all possible linear operators for an N -dimensional quantum register over C. Besides, X a and Z b follow the algebra
for all a, b ∈ GF (N ), where arithmetic in the subscripts is performed in GF (N ). After introducing the necessary notations, I am ready to construct the unitary operator T . Let T be a linear operator acting on an N -dimensional space where N = p n is a prime power. Inspired by the permuting property of the unitary operator used by Lo in the security proof of the six-state scheme [22] , I demand that the linear map T has to satisfy
for all a ∈ GF (N ), where α, β, γ ∈ GF (N ).
Note that T is a well-defined linear operator if we can find α, β, γ satisfying Eq. (8) . This is because Eqs. (3)- (8) imply that the action of T on a linear operator in the N -dimensional Hilbert space does not depend on a specific representation of the operator. Specifically, Proof: I only need to show that T 2 = 1 is a sufficient condition as this condition is clearly necessary. Eqs. (6) and (7) lead to
Since T acts on a finite dimensional Hilbert space and {X a Z b : a, b ∈ GF (N )} spans the set of all linear operators on that Hilbert space, T T † and T † T are constant multiples of the identity operator. Therefore,
The technical conditions in Eqs. (6)- (8) together with the equation T 2 = 1 guarantee the existence of a unitary T . Since Eqs. (6) and (7) are linear equations, T can be re-written as a linear combination of X a Z b 's in a polynomial time of log(N ). However, in order to fully utilize the error tolerance capability of an N -dimensional QKD scheme, T should satisfy one more constraint, namely, the order of T up to a global phase must be as large as possible. The theorem below tells us that the order is at most N +1. Most importantly, this order is attainable. (6)- (8) is at most N + 1.
where Λ k is a global phase factor. Then, a(k) and b(k) satisfy the equation
I denote the 2 × 2 matrix in Eq. (9) by M (T ) or simply M . Combining with Eq. (8), the characteristic equation of M equals Char(M ) = λ 2 − (α+ γ)λ+ 1. If Char(M ) is reducible in GF (N ), the order of M and hence also the order of T up to a global phase are at most N − 1. So, to construct T with a larger order, I must look for Char(M ) that is irreducible in GF (N ). Nevertheless, a degree two irreducible polynomial over GF (N ) splits in GF (N 2 ). Since the constant term of Char(M ) is 1, the roots of Char(M ) = 0 over GF (N 2 ) can be written as ξ and ξ −1 respectively. Since α + γ ∈ GF (N ),
However, ξ ∈ GF (N ) and hence ξ N +1 = 1. In other words, the order of the irreducible polynomial Char(M ) and hence the order of T up to a global phase both divide N + 1. More importantly, since N ≡ 1 mod (N + 1) and N 2 ≡ 1 mod (N + 1), Theorem 3.5 in Ref. [27] assures the existence of an order N +1 irreducible polynomial in the form λ 2 + cλ + 1 over GF (N ). (Actually, Theorem 3.5 in Ref. [27] implies that λ 2 +cλ+1 is irreducible over GF (N ) if and only if it is equal to (λ + ξ)(
Hence, such irreducible polynomials can be found efficiently.) Now, it remains to show that there exists T whose order of the corresponding characteristic polynomial Char(M (T )) equals N + 1. I divide the proof into two cases.
Case 1: p = 2 or p ≡ 1 mod 4 where N = p n . In this case, I simply pick α = 0, γ = −c and β = (−1) 1/2 . (Such a β ∈ GF (N ) exists because x 2 ≡ −1 mod p is solvable when p = 2 or p is a prime satisfying p ≡ 1 mod 4.) Then, it is easy to check that Eq. (8) is satisfied and hence T exists.
Case 2: p > 2. In this case, I pick α = 1, γ = −c − 1. In this way,
exists since p is an odd prime and
For illustration purpose, the choices of the 2 × 2 matrices and hence the unitary operators T for N = 2, 3 are tabulated in Table I . Incidentally, the unitary operator T listed in Table I for N = 2 is, up to a global phase, the same as the one used by Lo in his security proof of the six-state scheme in Ref. [22] .
Knowing that an order N +1 unitary operator T exists up to a global phase, I am ready to report the desired entanglementbased QKD scheme. But before doing so, I would like to report several important properties of T and M (T ) that will be used in the security proof of this QKD scheme in Section IV.
Lemma 2: Suppose the order of M (T ) equals
k is in the form aI for some a ∈ GF (N ) if and only if (1) p = 2 and N + 1|k; or (2) p > 2 and 
Corollary 1:
The period of the sequence
Proof: Direct application of Lemma 2.
Definition 3:
T defines an equivalent relationship for
Corollary 2:
There are N elements in the equivalent class
2 / ∼ each containing two distinct elements in the form (0, b).
Proof: By writing
′ ) if and only if there exists k such that
By eliminating k from the above equation, I obtain a quadratic equation involving variables a, b and b ′ . Thus, for a given a, b, there are at most two distinct b ′ satisfying Eq. (11). Hence, for every a ∈ GF (N ), there are at most two distinct b,
T . Using Eq. (10) to equate the first rows of the above two equations,
As N is odd, there are at most two solutions for 2k = (N + 1)/2 mod (N + 1). Thus, provided that N > 3, there exist more than two pairs of (k,
The remaining assertions then follow directly from Corollary 1.
B. An Entanglement-Based QKD Scheme
After the lengthy preparation in the previous subsection, we are ready to introduce the N -dimensional entanglementbased QKD scheme below. Let N be a prime power and T be the order N + 1 unitary operator described in Theorem 1 in Subsection III-A. Then, the QKD scheme goes as follows.
Entanglement-based QKD Scheme A 1) Alice prepares L ≫ 1 quantum particle pairs in the state i∈GF (N ) |ii / √ N . She applies one of the following unitary transformation to the second particle in each pair randomly and independently: I, T, T 2 , . . . , T N . For every pair of particles, Alice keeps the first one and sends the second one to Bob. He acknowledges the reception of these particles and then applies one of the following to each received particle randomly and independently: I −1 , T −1 , T −2 , . . . , T −N . Now, Alice and Bob publicly reveal their unitary transformations applied to each particle. A shared pair is then kept and is said to be in the set S i if Alice and Bob have applied T i and T −i to the second particle of the shared pair respectively. Thus in the absence of noise and Eve, each pair of shared particles kept by Alice and Bob should be in the state i∈GF (N ) |ii / √ N . 2) Alice and Bob estimate the (quantum) channel error rate by sacrificing a few particle pairs. Specifically, they randomly pick O(log[1/ǫ]/δ 2 ) pairs from each of the N +1 sets S i and measure each particle of the pair in the {|0 , |1 , · · · , |N − 1 } basis, namely the standard basis. They publicly announce and compare their measurement results. In this way, they know the estimated channel error rate within standard deviation δ with probability at least 1 − ǫ. (Detail proof of this claim can be found in Ref. [3] . A brief outline of the proof will also be given in Subsection IV-B for handy reference.) If the channel error rate is too high, they abort the scheme and start all over again. 3) Alice and Bob perform the following privacy amplification procedure. a) They apply the entanglement purification procedure with two way classical communication (LOCC2 EP) similar to the ones reported in Refs. [20] , [28] . Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly group their remaining quantum particles in tetrads; and each tetrad consists of two pairs shared between Alice and Bob in Step 1. Alice randomly picks one of the two particles in her share of each tetrad as the control register and the other one as the target. She applies the following unitary operation to the control and target registers:
where the subtraction is the usual subtraction in the finite field GF (N ). Bob applies the same unitary transformation to his corresponding share of particles in the tetrad. Then, they publicly announce their measurement results of their target registers in the standard basis. They keep their control registers only when the measurement results of their corresponding target registers agree. They repeat the above LOCC2 EP procedure until there is an integer r > 0 such that a single application of step 3b will bring the quantum channel error rate of the resultant particles down to less than an exponentially small number ǫ I /ℓ 2 for a fixed security parameter ǫ I > 0, where rℓ is the number of remaining pairs they shared currently. They abort the scheme either when r is greater than the number of remaining quantum pairs they possess or when they have used up all their quantum particles in this procedure. b) They apply the majority vote phase error correction (PEC) procedure introduced by Gottesman and Lo [23] . Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly divide the resultant particles into sets each containing r pairs of particles shared between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob separately apply the [r, 1, r] N phase error correction procedure to their corresponding shares of r particles in each set and retain their phase error corrected quantum particles. At this point, Alice and Bob should share ℓ almost perfect pairs i∈GF (N ) |ii / √ N with fidelity at least 1 − ǫ I /ℓ. Since ǫ I is an exponentially small number, so by measuring their shared pairs in the standard basis, Alice and Bob obtain their common key. More importantly, Eve's information on this common key is less than the exponentially small number security number ǫ I . (Proof of this claim can be found in Theorem 4 in Subsection IV-C below.)
Note that when N = 2, Scheme A is a variation of the six-state scheme introduced by Chau in Ref. [24] . The key difference is that the present one does not make use of Calderbank-Shor-Steane quantum code after PEC while the former one does.
IV. CRYPTANALAYSIS OF THE ENTANGLEMENT-BASED
QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME Now, I report a detail unconditional security proof of Scheme A in the limit of large number of quantum particle L transmitted. I also investigate the maximum error tolerance rate for Scheme A against the most general type of eavesdropping attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics. With suitable modifications, the security proof reported here can be extended to the case of a small finite L. Nevertheless, working in the limit of large L makes the asymptotic error tolerance rate analysis easier.
Before I begin the cryptanalysis, I first define various error rate measures in Subsection IV-A. Then, I briefly explain why a reliable upper bound of the channel error can be obtained by randomly testing only a small subset of quantum particles in step 2 of Scheme A in Subsection IV-B. Finally, I prove the security of the privacy amplification procedure in step 3 of Scheme A and analyze its error tolerance rate in Subsection IV-C. This completes the proof of unconditional security for entanglement-based Scheme A.
A. Various Measures Of Error Rates
A number of measures of the error rates will be used in my subsequent analysis. They are defined below.
Definition 4:
The channel quantum error rate refers to the rate of any quantum error occurring in a channel. The channel standard basis measurement error rate refers to the rate of any error in the form X a Z b with a = 0 occurring in a channel. The signal quantum error rate (or quantum error rate (QER) for short) refers to the rate of any quantum error occurring to the quantum signal at the end of the signal preparation and transmission stage. (In case of Scheme A, QER refers to the rate of any quantum error occurring in the pair i∈GF (N ) |ii / √ N shared by Alice and Bob.) The signal standard basis measurement error rate (or standard basis measurement error rate (SBMER) for short) refers to the rate of any error in the form X a Z b with a = 0 occurring in the signal at end of the signal preparation and transmission stage. (Thus, SBMER measures the apparent error rate of the signal when Alice and Bob measure their shares of particles in the standard basis.) In the special case of N = 2 n , any standard basis measurement result can be bijectively mapped to a nbit string. Thus, it makes sense to define the signal bit error rate (or bit error rate (BER) for short) as the bit error rate of standard basis measurement results of the signal at the end of the signal preparation and transmission stage.
B. Reliability On The Error Rate Estimation
In Scheme A, Alice and Bob keep only those particle pairs that are believed to be in the state i∈GF (N ) |ii / √ N at the end of step 1. Then, they measure some of them in the standard basis in the signal quality control test in step 2. More importantly, since all the LOCC2 EP and PEC privacy amplification procedures in step 3 map standard basis to standard basis, we can imagine conceptually that the final standard basis measurements of their shared secret key were performed right at the beginning of step 3. In this way, any quantum eavesdropping strategy used by Eve is reduced to a classical probabilistic cheating strategy [4] .
Further recall that in step 2, Alice and Bob do not care about the measurement outcome of an individual quantum register; they only care about the difference between the measurement outcome of Alice and the corresponding outcome of Bob. In other words, they apply the projection operators
to the randomly selected quantum registers they share in the set S 0 . These projection operators can be rewritten in a form involving Bell-like states as follows. Define |Φ ab to be the Bell-like state
Then the projection operator P a can also be written as
In a similar way, Alice and Bob apply the projection operators T −i P a T i to the set S i for all i. Now, it is straight-forward to check that the unitary operator T maps Bell-like states to Bell-like states. Combining with Eqs. (13) and (14), the signal quality control test in step 2 of Scheme A can be regarded as an effective random sampling test for the fidelity of the pairs as |Φ 00 ≡ i∈GF (N ) |ii / √ N .
At this point, classical sampling theory can be used to estimate the quantum channel error and hence the eavesdropping rate of the classical probabilistic cheating strategy used by Eve as well as the fidelity of the remaining pairs as |Φ 00 .
Lemma 3 (Adapted from Lo, Chau and Ardehali [3]):
Proof: Using earlier discussions in this subsection, the problem depicted in this lemma is equivalent to a classical random sampling problem without replacement whose solution follows directly from Lemma 1 in Ref. [3] .
Lemma 3 assures that by randomly choosing O(log[1/ǫ]/δ
2 ) out of L i pairs to test, the unbiased estimatorê i cannot underestimate the actual channel standard basis measurement error rate e i too much. More importantly, the number of particle pairs they need to test is independent of L i . Therefore, in the limit of large L i (and hence large L), randomly testing a negligibly small portion of quantum particle pairs is sufficient for Alice and Bob to know with high confidence the channel standard basis measurement error rate in the set S i [3] . In addition, the QER of the remaining untested particle pairs is the same as that of Proof: Recall that Eve does not know the choice of unitary operators applied by Alice and Bob in step 1 of Scheme A. Hence, in the limit of large L, the X a Z b error rate in the set S 0 is equal to that of T −k X a Z b T k in the set S k . Hence this theorem follows directly from Corollary 1 and Lemma 3.
In summary, once the signal quality control test in step 2 of Scheme A is passed, Alice and Bob have high confidence (of at least 1 − ǫ) that the QER of the remaining untested particle pairs is small.
Before leaving this subsection, I would like to point out that one can estimate the QER in a more aggressive way. Specifically, Alice and Bob do not simply know whether the measurement results of each tested pair are equal, in fact they know the difference between their measurement results in each tested pair. They may exploit this extra piece of information to better estimate the probability of X a Z b error in the signal for each a, b ∈ GF (N ). Such estimation helps them to devise tailor-made privacy amplification schemes to tackle the specific kind of error caused by channel noise and Eve. While this methodology will be useful in practical QKD, I shall not pursue this direction further here as the aim of this paper is the worst-case cryptanalysis in the limit of large number of quantum particle transfer L.
C. Security Of Privacy Amplification
It is convenient to use the following notation to study the effect of privacy amplification on QER.
Definition 5:
We denote the X a Z b error rate of the quantum particles shared by Alice and Bob just before step 3 in Scheme A by e ab . Similarly, we denote the X a Z b error rate of the resultant quantum particles shared by them after k rounds of LOCC2 EP by e k EP ab . Suppose further that Alice and Bob perform PEC using the [r, 1, r] N majority vote code after k rounds of LOCC2 EP. We denote the resultant X a Z b error rate by e PEC ab . Recall that Alice and Bob randomly and independently apply T i and T −j to each transmitted quantum register. More importantly, their choices are unknown to Eve when the quantum particle is traveling in the insecure channel. Now, let $ be the superoperator Eve applies to a particular quantum particle in the insecure channel. After Alice and Bob publicly announce their choices of quantum operations, that particle has 1/(N + 1) chance of suffering from T −i $T i for i = 0, 1, . . . , N given that the particle belongs to N i=0 S i . Besides, the privacy amplification procedure in step 3 is performed irrespective of which set S i the particle belong to. Therefore, the QER satisfies the constraints i,j∈GF (N )
After knowing the initial conditions for the QER, I investigate the effect of LOCC2 EP on the QER. Proof: Suppose the control and target registers in Bob's laboratory suffer from X a Z b and X a ′ Z b ′ errors respectively. (In contrast, those in Alice's hand are error-free as they never pass through the insecure noisy channel.) Then after applying the unitary operation in Eq. (12), the errors in the control and target registers will become X a Z b+b ′ and X a ′ −a Z b ′ respectively. Recall that Alice and Bob keep their control registers only when the measurement results of their corresponding target registers agree. In other words, they keep the control registers only when a = a ′ . Thus, once the control register in Bob's laboratory is kept, it will suffer an error X d Z c where d = a and c = b + b ′ . In the limit of large number of quantum register transmitted, the covariance between any two distinct quantum registers tends to zero and hence (17) in Lemma 4 can be expressed in a more compact and useful form below.
. With this notation in mind, e k EP ab in Eq. (17) can be rewritten as
e aj cos 2π
In particular, if e ab satisfies 
and e 
for b ∈ GF (p) and
Proof:
The numerator of Eq. (17) is equal to the sum of coefficients in the form x (20) and Corollary 2, the difference between the case of p = 2 and p > 2 is that e 00 and e 01 are the only two non-zero elements of {e 0b : b ∈ GF (N )} in the former case while e 00 , e 01 and e 0 −1 are the only three non-zero elements in the latter case.) Lemma 4 and Corollary 3 generalize a similar result for qubits [23] , [24] . I further remark that in case L is finite, e k EP ab is determined by solving the classical problem of randomly pairing an urn consisting of N 2 kinds of balls. Thus, in this case, e k EP ab is related to the so-called multivariate hypergeometric distribution whose theory is reviewed extensively in Ref. [29] .
In the qubit case, that is when N = p = 2, Eqs. (15) and (16) demand that e 01 = e 10 = e 11 = (1 − e 00 )/3. In other words, the evolution of QER under the action of LOCC2 EP depends on a single parameter, namely, e 00 . Nevertheless, the situation is more complicated when N > 2 because e k EP ab depends on more than one parameter. Fortunately, as we shall see later on, it is possible to determine the worst case scenario for e ab when the number of rounds of LOCC2 EP, k, is sufficiently large.
Lemma 5:
The following two statements hold if (1) p = 2 and e 00 > 1/(N + 2) or (2) p > 2 and e 00 > 2/(N + 3). (15) and (16), we have e 00 > (1 − e 00 )/(N + 1) = j =0 e 0j ≥ e ab for all (a, b) = (0, 0). Hence, Corollary 2 demands that j (e 0j − e ij ) ≥ e 00 − j =0 e 0j > 0 for all i = 0. By the same argument, if p > 2, j (e 0j − e ij ) ≥ e 00 − 2(1 − e 00 )/(N + 1) > 0 for all i = 0.
To prove the second statement, I express e 
where I have used Lemma 4 to arrive at the second line. Hence, e k EP 00 ≥ e k EP 0b for all b. In fact, our assumption on the value of e 00 implies that e 00 > e 0b for all b = 0. Hence from Eq. (27) , statement (b) holds for k = 1. The validity of statement (b) for all k ∈ Z + can then be shown by mathematical induction on k.
Theorem 3:
In the limit of large number of quantum particle transmitted from Alice to Bob, the X a Z b error rate after PEC e PEC ab using [r, 1, r] N majority vote code satisfies
Moreover,
2(e 00 + 1−e00
as k → ∞ provided that p = 2 and e 00 > 1/(N + 2); and that
as k → ∞ provided that p > 2 and e 00 > 2/(N + 3). Proof: Recall that the error syndrome of the [r, 1, r] N majority vote code is
Hence, after measuring the (phase) error syndrome, Z b error stays on the control register while X a error propagates from the control as well as all target registers to the resultant control quantum register [30] . Specifically, suppose the error on the ith quantum register is X ai Z bi for i = 1, 2, . . . , r. Then, after measuring the error syndrome, the resultant error in the remaining control register equals X a1+···+ar Z b1 . Consequently, upon PEC, the error in the remaining register is X a1+···+ar Z b where b is the majority of b i (i = 1, 2, . . . , r). In other words, after PEC, spin flip error rates are increased by at most r times. Hence, Eq. (28) holds.
In the limit of large number of quantum register transfer, the rate of any kind of phase error after PEC,
≤ (N − 1) max{Pr (the number of registers suffering from error in the form X a Z 1 is greater than or equal to those suffering from error in the form X a taken out of a random sample of r registers given a fixed e 00 )}
where the maximum is taken over all possible probabilities with different e ab 's satisfying the constraints Eqs. (15) and (16) . I denote the sum i∈GF (N ) e
s Pr(the number of registers suffering from error in the form X a Z 1 is greater than or equals to those suffering from error in the from X a taken out of a random sample of s registers given that these s registers are suffering from error in the form X a Z b for b = 0, 1 and given a fixed e 00 )}
where t → 1 as k → ∞. Note that I have used Eq. (1.2.5) in Ref. [31] to arrive at the second inequality above. (Eq. (1.2.5) applies because Lemma 5 implies that e
for a sufficiently large k.)
Since e 00 satisfies either (1) p = 2 and e 00 > 1/(N + 2) or (2) p > 2 and e 00 > 2/(N + 3), Lemma 5 tells us that ( j∈GF (N ) e 0j ) 2 k is a dominant term in the denominator of Eq. (19) . Hence, it is easy to check using Eq. (19) that both e k EP Z1 /e k EP Z0 and e k EP Z0 + e k EP Z1 are maximized if e ab = (1 − e 00 )/(N + 1) for all (a, b) ∼ (0, 1) when subjected to the following two constraints: (1) e 00 is fixed; and (2) Eqs. (15) and (16) (21) and (23) imply the validity of Eqs. (29) and (30) .
After going through all the detail preparation above, we are ready to prove the unconditional security of Scheme A.
Theorem 4:
For any given exponentially small positive numbers ǫ p and ǫ I , there exist an integer L > 0 and an exponentially small number δ > 0 such that whenever the number of quantum register transfer from Alice to Bob is greater than L, Scheme A is unconditionally secure with security parameters (ǫ p , ǫ I ). Moreover, a provably secure key is generated from Scheme A with probability at least 1 − ǫ p provided that the QER is less than or equals to e QER − δ where
when p = 2;
when N = 3; and
where
when p > 2 and N > 3.
Proof: According to Lemma 3 and Theorem 2, one finds a sufficiently small δ > 0 such that by testing O(log[1/ǫ p ]/δ 2 ) pairs, the probability of passing the signal quality test stage in step 2 of Scheme A given that the QER is higher than e QER equals ǫ p . Similarly, the probability of failing the signal quality test stage of Scheme A given that the QER is less than e QER − δ is less than 1 − ǫ p . Now, suppose that Alice and Bob arrive at the signal privacy amplification stage in step 3 of Scheme A. I first consider the case when p = 2. By applying sufficiently many rounds of LOCC2 EP, Alice and Bob may then pick r used in the majority vote PEC to be δ 1 / i∈GF (N ) j =0 e k EP ij for some exponentially small number δ 1 > 0. In the limit of k → ∞, Corollaries 2 and 3 imply that in the worst case scenario, there are at most two distinct b = b(a) and b ′ = b ′ (a) such that e ab , e ab ′ > 0 for all a = 0. Hence, r can be chosen to be
whenever e 00 > 1/(N + 2). Besides, in the limit k → ∞, r → ∞. So, from Eqs. (28) and (29) in Theorem 3, the QER of the remaining quantum registers after PEC, e final is upperbound by
N (e 00 + 1−e00 
This condition is satisfied if and only if
It is easy to verify that the constraint in Eq. (41) is consistent with the assumption that e 00 > 1/(N + 2). Hence, e final is exponentially small provided that the initial QER is less that 
Applying the same argument as in the proof of the case p = 2, e final is exponentially small as k → ∞ provided that 
where K(p) is given by Eq. (37). It is straight-forward to check that Eq. (47) is consistent with the assumption that e 00 > 2/(N + 3). Hence Eq. (36) holds. In summary, whenever the QER is strictly less than e QER and that the number of quantum particle transmitted from Alice and Bob L is sufficiently large, then after sufficiently many number of rounds of LOCC2 EP plus the final PEC, the QER of the remaining quantum registers shared between Alice and Bob e final is exponentially small. In fact, step 3b makes sure that the fidelity of these shared quantum registers is at least 1−ǫ I /ℓ where ℓ is the number of quantum particle pairs Alice and Bob shared and ǫ I is the fixed exponentially small number used in step 3 of Scheme A. So, by Footnote 28 in Ref. [4] , the mutual information between Eve and the secret key is at most ǫ I . Thus, the theorem is proved. A few remarks are in order. First, from Corollary 1, when p = 2, GF (N )/ ∼= {(0, b)/ ∼: b ∈ GF (N )} and hence the ratio between QER and SBMER for any kind of eavesdropping attacks equals N + 1 : N . In contrast, when p > 2, such a ratio varies between N + 1 : N − 1 to 1 : 1. Combining these observations with Theorem 4, I conclude that the maximum tolerable SBMER for Scheme A is given by
In addition, if p = 2, Corollary 2 implies that there is a unique
Hence, by converting each standard basis measurement result of an N -dimensional quantum particle into a log 2 N -bit string, the ratio between QER and BER is at least N + 1 : (1 + 0.5N log 2 N )/ log 2 N . Consequently, the maximum tolerable BER for Scheme A is given by
Now, I tabulate the tolerable SBMER and BER in Table II below. Second, I analyze the error tolerance capability of Scheme A as a function of N . Table II shows that the maximum tolerable BER e BER for N = 2 is the same as the one obtained earlier by Chau in Ref. [24] . More importantly, e SBMER fluctuates for different N 's. Nevertheless, one can deduce from Eqs. (34)- (37) and (48)- (49) that the tolerable SBMER and BER tend to 100% and 50% respectively as N → ∞. Specifically, as n → ∞, the tolerable BER for Scheme A using 2 n -level quantum particles scales as ≈ 1/2−(3+ √ 5)/2 n+1 . Similarly, if p > 2, e SBMER for Scheme A using p n -level quantum particles scales like ≈ 1 − 3/p n as n → ∞. Third, readers may wonder why Scheme A is highly errortolerant especially when N is large. Recall that Eve does not know which particles are in set S i when the particles are transmitted from Alice to Bob. Hence, in the limit of large number of quantum particle transfer L, e ab satisfies the constraints in Eqs. (15) and (16) . This greatly limits the relative occurrence rates between different types of quantum errors. At this point, the LOCC2 EP becomes a powerful tool to reduce the spin errors at the expense of increasing phase errors. Furthermore, provided that the condition in Lemma 5 holds, e k EP Z0 > e k EP Z b for all b = 0. In other words, the dominant kind of phase error is having no phase error at all. Thus, the majority vote PEC procedure is effective in bringing down the phase error. This is the underlying reason why Scheme A is so powerful that in the limit N → ∞, e SBMER → 1 − . Fourth, the SBMER tolerable by Scheme A outperforms any qubit-based QKD scheme. This assertion follows direction from Corollary 4 and Theorem 5 below.
Lemma 6:
Let N = p n where p is a prime. The tolerable SBMER e SBMER for Scheme A using N -dimensional quantum particles increases as n increases for a fixed p. In addition, when n = 1, e SBMER increases as p increases. Proof: The first assertion is a direct consequence of Eqs. (34) and (36).
Since K(p) > 0 and d[(p + 1)K(p)]/dp > 0 whenever p ≥ 2, therefore Eq. (36) is an increasing function of N provided that N = p ≥ 2. Thus, the second assertion is also valid.
Corollary 4:
The maximum tolerable SBMER for Scheme A is strictly greater than 1/3 whenever N ≥ 4. Besides, the maximum tolerable BER for Scheme A is strictly greater than 1/3 whenever N ≥ 16 and N is a power of 2.
Proof: From Lemma 6, the first assertion of this Corollary holds if I can show that e SBMER > 1/3 whenever N = 4 and N = 5. And these two conditions are satisfied by referring to Theorem 4 and Table II. To prove the second assertion of this Corollary, one needs to observe that e BER is an increasing function of n. Besides, from Table II, e BER > 1/3 for N = 16.
Theorem 5:
The QER and SBMER tolerable by any QKD scheme involving the transfer of N -dimensional quantum particles cannot exceed (N − 1)/N and (N 2 − 2)/[N (N + 1)] respectively whenever N is a prime power. Hence, the BER for any QKD scheme involving the transfer of 2 ndimensional quantum particles cannot exceed (2 2n − 2)(0.5 + 1/n)/[2 n (2 n + 1)]. Furthermore, the SBMER tolerable by Scheme A is upper-bound by
The proof follows the idea reported in Ref. [23] . Specifically, I denote P a,b,c = i∈GF
and c ∈ GF (N ). It is straight-forward to check that P a,b,c are projection operators whose ranges are onedimensional. Suppose |ψ a,b,c spans the range of P a,b,c . Since P a,b,c P a,b,c ′ = 0 for all c, c ′ ∈ GF (N ), B a,b = {|ψ a,b,c : c ∈ GF (N )} is a basis for all (a, b) = (0, 0). Now, Eve measures every particle passing through the insecure quantum channel randomly and independently in one the basis B a,b . Eve records her measurement result and resends the measured quantum state to Bob. In this way, no quantum correlation between Alice and Bob can survive and hence no provably secure key can be distributed by a QKD scheme involving the transfer of N -dimensional quantum particles under this particular eavesdropping attack. It is straight-forward to check that each of the projection operators above causes an quantum error in the form X a Z b with probability (N − 1)/N . Moreover, there are only N such projection operations that cause only phase errors. Hence, the QER and SBMER cannot exceed Fifth, the privacy amplification performed in Scheme A is based entirely on entanglement purification and phase error correction. In fact, the key ingredient in reducing the QER used in the proof of Theorem 4 is the validity of conditions shown in Eqs. (40) or (46). Nonetheless, there is no need to bring down the QER to an exponentially small number. In fact, one may devise an equally secure scheme by following the adaptive procedure introduced by Chau in Ref. [24] . That is to say, Alice and Bob may switch to an concatenated Calderbank-Shor-Steane quantum code when the PEC brings down the QER to about 5%. The strategy of adding an extra step of quantum error correction towards the end of the privacy amplification procedure is certainly useful: it increases the key generation rate by greatly reducing the values of k used in LOCC2 EP and r used in PEC.
V. REDUCTION TO THE PREPARE-AND-MEASURE SCHEME Finally, I apply the standard Shor and Preskill proof [21] to reduce the entanglement-based Scheme A to a provably secure prepare-and-measure scheme in this section. Let me first write down the detail procedures of Scheme B before showing its security.
Prepare-and-measure QKD Scheme B 1) Alice randomly and independently prepares L ≫ 1 quantum particles in the standard basis. She applies one of the following unitary transformation to each particle randomly and independently: I, T, T 2 , . . . , T N . Alice records the states and transformations she applied and then sends the states to Bob. He acknowledges the reception of these particles and then applies one of the following to each received particles randomly and independently: I −1 , T −1 , T −2 , . . . , T −N . Now, Alice and Bob publicly reveal their unitary transformations applied to each particle. A particle is kept and is said to be in the set S i if Alice and Bob have applied T i and T −i to it respectively. Bob measures the particles in S i in the standard basis and records the measurement results. 2) Alice and Bob estimate the (quantum) channel error rate by sacrificing a few particles. Specifically, they randomly pick O(log[1/ǫ]/δ 2 ) pairs from each of the N + 1 sets S i and publicly reveal the preparation and measured states for each of them. In this way, they know the estimated channel error rate within standard deviation δ with probability at least 1 − ǫ. If the channel error rate is too high, they abort the scheme and start all over again. 3) Alice and Bob perform the following privacy amplification procedure. a) They apply the entanglement purification procedure with two way classical communication (LOCC2 EP) similar to the ones reported in Refs. [20] , [28] . Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly group their corresponding remaining quantum particles in pairs. They publicly compare the differences between the values of preparation/measurement in their corresponding pairs (where arithmetic is done in GF (N )). They keep one of their corresponding registers of the pair only when the difference between the values of the corresponding pairs recorded by Alice and Bob agrees. They repeat the above LOCC2 EP procedure until there is an integer r > 0 such that a single application of step 3b will bring the quantum channel error rate of the resultant particles down to an exponentially small number ǫ I /rℓ 2 for a fixed security parameter ǫ I > 0, where rℓ is the number of remaining quantum particles they have. They abort the scheme either when r is greater than the number of remaining quantum particles they possess or when they have used up all their quantum particles in this procedure. b) They apply the majority vote phase error correction (PEC) procedure introduced by Gottesman and Lo [23] . Specifically, Alice and Bob randomly divide their corresponding resultant particles into sets each containing r particles. They replace each set by the sum of the values prepared or measured of the r particles in the set. These replaced values are bits of their final secure key string. [21] ): Scheme A in Section III and Scheme B above are equally secure. Thus, conclusions of Theorem 4 also apply in Scheme B.
Theorem 6 (Based on Shor and Preskill
Proof: Recall from Ref. [21] that Alice may measure all her share of quantum registers right at step 1 in Scheme A without affecting the security of the scheme. Besides, LOCC2 EP and PEC procedures in Scheme A simply permute the measurement basis. More importantly, the final secret key generation does not make use of the phase information of the transmitted quantum registers. Hence, the Shor-Preskill argument in Ref. [21] can be applied to Scheme A, giving us an equally secure prepare-and-measure Scheme B above.
At this point, I need to point out an important remark on the number of different kinds of states Alice have to prepare in Scheme B. To distribute the key using an N -level quantum system with N = 2 n , Corollary 1 tells us that T k = I for all k = 1, 2, . . . , N . Therefore, T i |j 's are distinct states for 0 ≤ i ≤ N and j ∈ GF (N ). Thus, Scheme B is a N (N + 1)-state scheme. In contrast, if N = p n with p > 2, then T (N +1)/2 = −I by Corollary 1. Therefore, in this case, upon measurement on the standard basis, Scheme B is a N (N + 1)/2-state scheme. This observation suggests that there may be rooms for improving the error tolerance rate of an prepareand-measure QKD scheme involving N -dimensional quantum particles for an odd N .
VI. DISCUSSIONS
In summary, I have introduced a prepared-and-measured QKD scheme (Scheme B) and proved its unconditional security. In particular, I show that Scheme B generates a provably secure key even at one-third SBMER (BER) whenever the Hilbert space dimension of quantum particles used N is a prime power greater than 3 (a power of 2 greater than 8). This result convincingly demonstrates the advantage of using higher dimensional quantum particles as signal carriers in QKD.
There is a tradeoff between the error tolerance rate and key generation efficiency, however. It is clear from the proof of Theorem 4 that r and hence also the number of quantum particle transfer from Alice and Bob L scales exponentially with k. Besides, the probability that the measurement results agree and hence the control quantum register pairs are kept in LOCC2 EP equals ≈ 1/N in the worst case. Thus, while the Scheme B is highly error-tolerant, it generates a secret key with exponentially small efficiency in the worst possible scenario. Fortunately, the adaptive nature of Scheme B makes sure that this scenario will not happen when the error rate of the channel is small. To conclude, in most practical situations, Alice and Bob should choose the smallest possible N whose corresponding e SBMER is slightly larger than the channel standard basis measurement error rate. In this way, they expect to almost surely generate their provably secure key at the highest possible rate.
As I have noted in Section V, there may be room for improving the error tolerance rate in case p > 2 since Scheme B uses only N (N + 1)/2 different quantum states in signal transmission. It is instructive to explore such a possibility.
